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Using Norwegian registry data we investigate how paternity leave affects fathers’ long-term 
earnings. In 1993 Norway introduced a paternity quota of the paid parental leave. We estimate 
a difference-in-differences model which exploits differences in fathers' exposure to the 
paternity quota. Our analysis suggests that four weeks paternity leave during the child’s first 
year decreases fathers’ future earnings by 2.1 percent. Importantly, this effect persists up until 
our last point of observation when the child is five years old. The earnings effect is consistent 
with increased long-term father involvement, as fathers shift time and effort from market to 
home production. In an investigation of Norwegian time use data we find additional evidence 
for this hypothesis. 
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During the last decades there has been an increased political and public concern over 
fathers’ involvement in their children’s lives. In the USA, for example, the Clinton 
Administration launched in 1995 a government-wide initiative to strengthen the role of fathers 
in families.
1 Moreover, American television watchers have frequently come across advertising 
campaigns encouraging male viewers to be more involved with their children.
2 This concern 
over father involvement has been fuelled by increasing empirical evidence suggesting that the 
involvement of a father in his children’s lives is important for the children’s cognitive and 
socio-emotional outcomes.
3 
In this paper we investigate whether paternity leave during the child’s first year can 
increase long-term father involvement. We consider a father to be more involved with his 
child if he spends more time together with that child.
4 Paternity leave might affect a father’s 
long-term involvement through at least two different mechanisms (Tanaka and Waldfogel 
2007). First, a father caring for an infant child may facilitate father-child bonding. Second, 
paternity leave could make it easier for the father to be more involved as the child grows older 
by preventing the mother from gaining exclusive expertise in child caring during the child’s 
first year. 
There is a large and recent economic literature investigating impacts of maternity 
leave.
5 However, the empirical evidence on paternity leave is scant. Even if not conclusive, 
this study provides some of the first evidence that paternity leave has a causal effect on father 
long-term involvement.
6 This is important because it suggests that paternity leave policies 
have implications for child well-being (Han, Ruhm and Waldfogel 2009). The policy 
relevance of our findings is highlighted by a recent resolution in the European Parliament. In 
March 2010, the European Parliament adopted a directive stipulating the minimum 
                                                 
1 Clinton, 1995: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Supporting the Role of 
Fathers in Families. White House, June 16, 1995.  
2 See for example advertisements from the National Father Initiative at 
http://www.fatherhood.org/media/PSAs/tv.asp. 
3See for example Lamb (2010) and Tamis-Lemonda and Cabrera (2002). 
4 Perhaps unfairly, a father who never sees his children because he works long hours in order to make enough 
money for their college education is not characterized as an involved father. 
5  Se for example Baker and Milligan (2008a, 2008b, 2010), Carneiro, Løken and Salvanes (2009a, 2009b), 
Dustmann and Schönberg (2008),  Ruhm (1998, 2004), Schönberg and Ludsteck (2007). 
6 There exist several studies documenting an association between paternity leave and father involvement. Using 
US data, Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel (2007) demonstrate that longer paternity leave at the time of the 
childbirth is associated with more child care-taking activities nine months after the birth. Similar results are 
found in Tanaka and Waldfogel (2007) utilizing UK survey data and Haas and Hwang (2008) utilizing Swedish 
survey data. See recent review of empirical findings in Haas and Hwang (2008). requirements for parental leave, including a non-transferrable paternity quota of four weeks.
7 
Our study suggests that paternity leave has the expected positive effect on long-term father 
involvement and that implementing paternity quotas of the parental leave is an adequate 
policy action to support the role of fathers in families. 
Estimating a causal relationship between paternity leave and father involvement faces 
two main challenges: concerns of omitted variable bias and the scarcity of appropriate data. 
Omitted variable bias arises if a father’s decision to take paternity leave is correlated with 
unobservables that also affect father involvement, such as the father’s preferences for 
spending time with his child. To circumvent the most obvious forms of omitted variable bias, 
our empirical strategy utilizes the Norwegian introduction of a paternity quota in 1993. From 
1993, four weeks of the total of 42 weeks of paid parental leave were reserved exclusively for 
the father. With few exceptions the family would lose those four weeks of paid parental leave 
if these were not taken by the father. The introduction of the paternity quota led to a sharp 
increase in uptake rates. In our sample of full-time working fathers, the utilization rate was 
less than three percent prior to 1993, but had increased to about 60 percent already by 1995.  
Investigating the relationship between paternity leave and father involvement is also 
constrained by data availability. The task requires appropriate indicators for father 
involvement throughout the child’s life. In this study we obtain these indicators by utilizing a 
comprehensive, longitudinal registry database containing annual records of earnings for every 
person in Norway. If the paternity quota increased long-term father involvement, then we 
should expect a reduction in fathers’ long-term earnings, as they shift time and effort from 
market to home production (Becker 1985).
8 We supplement our investigation of registry data 
with analyses of data from Norwegian time use surveys.  
In our main empirical investigation we estimate the effects of the paternity quota on 
fathers’ earnings. We estimate a difference-in-differences (DD) model which exploits 
differences in fathers' exposure to the paternity quota. Our analysis suggests that four weeks 
paternity leave during the child’s first year decreases fathers’ future earnings by 2.1 percent. 
This effect persists up until our last point of observation which is when the child is five years 
old. 
The negative effect of paternity leave on long-term earnings is consistent with the idea 
that the father is spending less time at work and more time together with his child. However, 
                                                 
7 European Union: Council Directive 2010/18/EU.  
8 Notably, reduced labor supply (and possibly lower productivity) has a direct negative effect on short and long-
term earnings, in addition to an indirect negative effect on long-term earnings through reduced human capital 
accumulation. there are also several other reasons why the quota could affect fathers’ earnings. For example, 
absence from work while being on paternity leave reduces accumulation of work experience 
and work related human capital. Alternatively, taking time off from work to be on paternity 
leave may serve as a signal of being more family-oriented rather than career-oriented. 
Employers may consider such employees as being less devoted and reliable, thus reducing the 
likelihood of their giving promotions and pay raises.  
Unfortunately, our registry data does not allow us to distinguish between the different 
mechanisms for how the paternity quota affects fathers’ earnings. Consequently we turn to 
time diaries from the Norwegian Time Use Surveys in 1990 and 2000 in order to provide 
more direct evidence for the effect of the paternity quota on father involvement. Using a 
similar difference-in-differences approach, we find that fathers spent significantly less time 
working and more time together with their children after the paternity quota was 
implemented. Admittedly, an important limitation of this analysis is that we only observe 
fathers’ time use in 1990 and 2000. This makes it impossible to closely connect the changes 
in time use to the introduction of the paternity quota. Nevertheless, together with our analysis 
of registry data, which provides convincing evidence of a causal effect of the paternity quota 
on earnings, the time use analyses suggest that the paternity quota had an impact on long-term 
father involvement. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we give a brief 
overview of the paternity quota and other relevant family policies. Section 3 describes our 
registry data, and in Section 4 we discuss our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents our 
results. In Section 6 we investigate mechanisms using data from time use surveys. Section 7 
concludes.  
 
2. The Paternity Quota 
On April 1
st 1993, Norway introduced a paternity quota of the paid parental leave. 
Four weeks of the total of 42 weeks of paid parental leave were reserved exclusively for the 
father.
 9 With few exceptions, the family would lose those four weeks of paid parental leave if 
not taken by the father. Apart from the four weeks paternity quota and three weeks prior to 
and six weeks after birth, which were reserved for the mother for medical reasons, parents 
                                                 
9 Alternatively, parents could take 52 weeks of parental leave at 80 percent pay. Earnings above 6*”Basic 
Amount” (around €19 000 in 2010) are not compensated by the government. Around 17 (48) percent of all 
women (men) above 17 years of age earn more than this earnings ceiling. However, most employers (private and 
public) compensate earnings above this ceiling.  could share the parental leave between them as they desired.
10 While paid maternity leave was 
only contingent on the mother working at least 50 percent of full-time prior to birth, paid 
paternity leave was contingent on both parents working at least 50 percent. Income 
compensation was based on the earnings of the person on leave, but fathers’ income 
compensation was reduced proportionally if the mother did not work full-time prior to birth.
11  
The introduction of the paternity quota led to a sharp increase in uptake rates. Based 
on our analytical sample of full-time employed fathers
12, we see in Figure 1 that less than 
three percent of the fathers whose child was born prior to 1993 utilized parental leave. After 
the paternity quota was introduced in 1993, about 30 percent of fathers made use of their right 
to paternity leave, increasing to 51 percent in 1994 and 59 percent in 1995. More than 70 
percent of full-time employed fathers of children born in 2000 took paternity leave.
13 As 
Figure 1 reveals, the paternity quota had low uptake the first years after implementation, 
particularly for children born in 1993 and 1994. We will consequently refer to the fathers of 





















Figure 1: Uptake rates: Percent of fathers in our analytical sample taking paternity leave by 
birth year of child.  
 
 
Fathers were entitled to utilize their right to paternity leave up until the child turned 
three years old. However, 95 percent of all fathers who utilized their right to paternity leave 
                                                 
10 Fathers have been eligible for parental leave since 1978.  
11 After 2000, a father’s income compensation was only reduced if the mother worked less than 75 percent of 
full-time prior to birth. From 2005, a father’s income compensation is independent of how much the mother 
works prior to birth, but is contingent on the mother being occupationally active while he is on leave. 
12 For a full description of our analytical sample, see Section 3. 
13 Official uptake rates from the Norwegian National Insurance Administration are higher since they calculate 
the uptake rate of entitled fathers.  took leave in conjunction with the mothers’ leave during the child’s first year. Among fathers 
taking paternity leave, around 70 percent were on leave for four weeks, 20 percent took less 
leave, and the remaining 10 percent took more than the designated four weeks of leave.
14 This 
picture remained relatively constant during our period of study.  
We will utilize the introduction of the paternity quota to investigate a causal effect of 
paternity leave on father involvement. The shadings in Figure 2 illustrate the nature of the 
experiment. Notably, we construct our experiment based on the age of the youngest child. 
This is because the father of a child born prior to the introduction of the paternity quota may 
still be treated if the father is on paternity leave with a younger child. Each row in Figure 2 
represents the age of the father’s youngest child, and each column represents a given year. To 
illustrate, the single cell 1997/3 represents fathers whose youngest child turned 3 in 1997. 
Fathers of each cohort enter into multiple cells diagonally in the figure, according to the age 
of the father’s youngest child. Darkly shaded cells represent fathers treated by the reform after 
the phase-in-period. These are fathers whose youngest child is born after 1994. At this point 
nearly 60 percent of the fathers utilized parental leave. Lightly shaded cells represent fathers 
treated by the reform during the phase-in-period in 1993 or 1994. White cells represent non-
treated fathers.  
 
   1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
1 year                            
2 years                            
3 years                            
4 years                            
5 years                            
6 years                            
7 years                            
8 years                            
Figure  2:  Nature  of  the  experimental  design.  Darkly  shaded  cells  represent 
fathers  treated  by  the  reform  after  the  phase-in-period,  lightly  shaded  cells 
represent fathers treated by the reform during the phase-in-period, and white 
cells represent non-treated fathers.  
 
In addition to the paternity quota, Norway implemented several work-family related 
policies during our period of study. These policies may have affected mothers’ and fathers’ 
long-term involvement. In particular, there was a large extension in paid parental leave 
between 1986 and 1993. In 1986, Norwegian parents were granted 18 weeks of paid parental 
leave, but during subsequent years leave rights were gradually extended to 35 weeks in 1992, 
                                                 
14 Numbers obtained from the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration.  and finally to 42 weeks in 1993. Figure 3 shows how many weeks of paid parental leave 
parents of different age cohorts were granted. Similarly to Figure 2, each cell represents 
parents of children of a given age in a given year, and parents of a given cohort of children 
can be followed diagonally in the figure. The figure shows large extensions in parental leave 
rights prior to the introduction of the paternity quota in 1993. Fathers’ direct utilization of 
these extensions was, however, negligible. As discussed above, less than three percent of 
fathers took paternity leave prior to 1993 and among those taking leave after 1993, only 10 
percent took more than the designated four weeks.  
 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
1 year  32  35  42  42  42  42  42  42  42 
2 years  28  32  35  42  42  42  42  42  42 
3 years  24  28  32  35  42  42  42  42  42 
4 years  22  24  28  32  35  42  42  42  42 
5 years  20  22  24  28  32  35  42  42  42 
6 years  18  20  22  24  28  32  35  42  42 
7 years  18  18  20  22  24  28  32  35  42 
8 years  18  18  18  20  22  24  28  32  35 
Figure 3: Number of weeks of total parental leave with 100 percent coverage.  
 
In addition to the extensions in paid parental leave, in 1995 both parents became 
entitled to job protection during one additional year of unpaid leave. In line with paternity 
leave prior to 1993, few fathers utilized this right.
15 Moreover, in 1998 a cash-for-care 
subsidy was introduced for families with one or two year old children that did not utilize 
governmentally subsidized daycare. The cash-for-care subsidy was a tax-free transfer, and, at 
the time it was introduced, was equivalent to approximately $600 per month. Nearly 80 
percent of all families with a one or two year old received the subsidy. The cash-for-care 
subsidy decreased eligible mothers’ labor force participation by 5-6 percentage points, but 
had no effect on fathers’ labor force participation (Schøne 2004; Drange and Rege 2010). 
In summary, even if Norway implemented several work-family related policies in 
addition to the paternity quota, fathers’ direct utilization of these reforms has been negligible. 
Notably, however, if any of these reforms decreased mothers’ future labor supply, then this 
may have indirectly motivated fathers to increase their labor supply in order to compensate 
for the family’s income loss or because he is less needed in household production (Becker 
                                                 
15 Only 5 percent of fathers of children born in 2007 utilized their right to unpaid leave. The majority of these 
(54 percent) were on unpaid leave for two weeks or less (Grambo and Myklebø 2009). Corresponding numbers 
for 1995-2000 are not available.  1985). In this way, mothers’ utilization of extended leave rights may have had a negative 
impact on father involvement. Consequently, our empirical analyses will investigate whether 
our estimated effect of the paternity quota is downward biased by these other policy reforms.  
 
3. Data and Sample Description 
In our main empirical investigation we will analyze how the introduction of the 
paternity quota affected fathers’ earnings. If the paternity quota increased fathers’ long-term 
involvement, then we should expect a reduction in fathers’ long-term earnings, as fathers shift 
time and effort from market to home production (Becker 1985). We will investigate this 
hypothesis by utilizing a combination of several official Norwegian registers, prepared and 
provided by Statistics Norway. The dataset contains records for every Norwegian from 1992 
to 2002. The variables include individual demographic information (gender, age, marital 
status, number of children, birthdates of children), socio-economic data (years of education 
and earnings, and municipality of residence) and current employment status (full-time, part-
time, minor part-time, self-employed).  
We restrict our sample to all fathers whose youngest child was between 1 and 8 years 
old during the years 1992 to 2000. Constructing our sample based on the age of the youngest 
child is important because fathers of children born prior to the introduction of the paternity 
quota may still be treated if they were on paternity leave with a younger child. The purpose of 
the remaining sample restrictions is to exclude fathers who are not eligible for paternity leave 
because of a weak attachment to the labor force First, we limit our sample to fathers who are 
currently full-time employed.
16 Our definition of full-time employed allows for considerable 
variation in working hours. According to the most recent data on men’s labor force 
participation, 10 percent of all full-time working men work 30-36 hours per week, 75 percent 
work 37-43 hours per week and 15 percent work more than 44 hours per week.
17  
Second, since students have a weak attachment to the labor force, we restrict the 
sample to couples where both parents were older than 25 years when the child was born. 
Third, we limit our sample to individuals born in Norway to Norwegian-born parents since 
immigrants in general have substantially weaker labor force attachment (Olsen 2008) and 
thereby less entitlement to parental leave. Ideally, we would exclude separated couples since 
                                                 
16 A worker is recorded as full-time employed if he is registered as full-time employed (at least 30 hours work 
per week) at the end of the year and had earnings above an indexed minimum of about €19 000 in 2010 (2 times 
“Basic Amount”). We add the earnings restriction because firms are often late in reporting changes in 
employment status after a work spell has ended. 
17 Labour Force Survey, Statistics Norway, 2010. fathers not living together with the child’s mother are exempt from the paternity quota. 
However, marital status is potentially endogenous to the reform and we do not observe 
marital status prior to 1992. Among the fathers in our sample, 91 percent are living together 
with the child’s mother. 
Notably, the full-time employment sample restriction may be endogenous if the reform 
had an impact on the fathers’ decisions to be full-time employed. We carefully investigate 
such possible endogeneities in our data analyses. Clearly, the first best solution would have 
been to limit our sample to fathers who were full-time employed at the time of the child’s 
birth. However, since we do not observe employment status prior to 1992, we are restricted to 
using current employment status instead.  
The sample selection criteria leave us with a total of 1 127 093 observations for 261 
324 fathers of 327 893 children. Notably, in our sample we have several earnings 
observations for each father. For example, a father with a six year old child in 1992 will have 
a seven year old child in 1993, and an eight year old in 1994. Consequently, we will observe 
his earnings in 1992-1994 (See Figure 2, a father is followed diagonally). After 1994 his child 
is too old to be included in the sample and we do not observe his earnings. However, if this 
father has a new child in 1995, he will again enter our sample with a one year old in 1996, and 
a two year old in 1997, etc. Consequently, we will observe earnings for this father in all years 
except 1995. We use Stata-cluster estimation to correct for multiple observations for each 
father.  
Our data allows us to construct several variables capturing important child, father and 
mother characteristics. Similarly to employment status, we do not observe pre-birth 
characteristics for fathers of children born prior to 1993 and consequently we construct our 
covariates from current characteristics, observed in the same year as we observe outcome. We 
therefore limit covariates to characteristics that are most likely exogenous to the reform. 
Moreover, our empirical analyses assure that our results are robust to the inclusion and 
exclusion of different covariates.  
Our empirical analysis utilizes the following covariates, in addition to year fixed 
effects; 
-  Youngest Child Characteristics: number of older siblings (0,1,2....6, >7)
 18, child’s age 
(1,2,…,8), child’s gender, birth month (1,2…12)  
                                                 
18 Parenthetical documentation on any control variable indicates the ranges of the series of categorical variables 
which characterize the specific trait. -  Father and Mother Characteristics: age at birth of youngest child (linear and quadratic), 
age at birth of first child (linear and quadratic) and education level (not completed high 
school, high school degree, university degree).
19 
Summary statistics of all observations of fathers in our sample are presented in Table 
1. Fathers in our sample were on average 34 years old at the time when the child was born. 
About 9 percent of the fathers in our sample have not completed a high school degree, and 32 
percent have a university degree. The fathers have on average 2.3 children.  
In Table 2 we present cohort specific summary statistics for fathers of all children in 
our sample. In Panel A characteristics are measured one year prior to the child’s birth
20 and in 
Panel B characteristics are measured when the child is three years old. In both panels each 
father is only observed once for each child. Some cells have missing numbers because data is 
not available. Notably, with the naked eye we cannot observe any discontinuity in 
characteristics occurring for fathers of the cohort born in 1995, the first fully treated cohort. 
Neither can we observe any discontinuity in fathers’ earnings measured when the child is 
three years old.  
 
4. Empirical strategy 
We identify the effect on earnings of being on paternity leave by exploiting variation 
in exposure across fathers over time and the youngest child’s age in a difference-in-difference 
(DD) approach.
21 More specifically, we look at the difference in earnings in a given year 
between treated and non-treated fathers. However, non-treated and treated fathers in a given 
year have children of different ages, which alone is likely to have an impact on earnings. To 
control for such an age effect, we compare the earnings difference to a corresponding earnings 
difference in a year prior to the introduction of the paternity quota. The deviation between 
these two differences is attributed to the paternity quota. The identifying assumption is that 
absent the reform, time trends in earnings would be similar for fathers of children of various 
ages.  
In order to utilize the extensive dataset available and to illustrate that our effect 
estimates are robust to choice of treatment and comparison group, we estimate variation in 
earnings for all fathers in our sample during the whole period based on the DD-approach 
                                                 
19 Education level is potentially endogenous to the reform. However, less than 1 percent of the fathers in our 
sample reach a higher education level during our period of study. 
20 Since we do not observe pre-birth characteristics for fathers of children born prior to 1993, data prior to birth 
are not included in our analyses but displayed here for the sake of comparison.  
21 Since the paternity quota had low uptake the two first years after implementation, , it would not be possible to 
identify any discontinuity in fathers’ earnings associated with the introduction date of the paternity quota. described above: We estimate the incremental effect on earnings of being a father of a child in 
a certain age in a specific year (i.e. being a father in a specific cell in Figure 2), compared to a 
common reference group, when time and age trends are controlled for by the inclusion of year 
and age fixed effects. The reference group is chosen to be seven and eight years old in 1992. 
Year 1992 was the first year of observations in our data set. Moreover, children seven and 
eight years old are non-treated during the entire period we observe the individuals.
22  
Our DD-estimates take the following form: 
 
(1)  ) ( ) ( 1992 , 8 7 1992 , , 8 7 , , - - - - - = I I I I a y y a y a h           where y = 1993,1994….2000 
               a = 1,2…..6 
 
The term (Ia,y – I7-8,y ) measures in a given year, y, the difference in earnings of fathers of 
children aged 7-8 and children aged a. The term (Ia,1992 – I7-8,1992) measures the corresponding 
difference, measured in 1992. If treated fathers earn less (more) than non-treated fathers, our 
DD-estimates, ηay, for fathers of children born after the reform will be negative (positive).  
In order to estimate the DD-coefficients, ηay , we specify the following regression:  
 
(2)  iay iy a y ay a a y y iay X A Y A Y I e b h d g a + + ´ + + + = ) (  
 
where Iiay denotes log-earnings for father i of a (youngest) child aged a (a=1,2…6) in year y 
(y=1993,1994…2000). Yy  and Aa  are vectors with year and age dummy variables, where γy 
and δa capture year and age fixed effects. Xiy is a vector of father, mother and child 
characteristics described in Section 3.  
The coefficients of interest in Equation 2 are captured by the matrix ηay, which 
measures the incremental change in earnings for fathers of children of a given age, a, in a 
given year, y, compared to fathers of seven and eight year olds in 1992. Importantly, if the 
paternity quota had a negative effect on fathers’ earnings, we should be able to identify a 
pattern associated with treated or non-treated fathers in the estimates of ηay . This pattern 
should look similar to the step-wise pattern illustrated in Figure 2. We should see significant 
negative coefficients for each ηay that correspond to treated cells (darkly shaded cells in Figure 
                                                 
22 An exception is fathers of children 7 years old in 2000. These children were born in 1993 and the fathers are 
consequently partly treated. This may raise some scepticism for the 2000 estimates. However, we see no effect 
on this cohort prior to year 2000 (See results in Table 3). Consequently, we consider it unproblematic to use 7 
and 8 year olds in the reference group for the year 2000 estimates. Furthermore, a specification test (not reported 
here) when only 8 year olds constitute the comparison group gives similar but less precise results.  2). Moreover, coefficients for each ηay that corresponds to non-treated cells should not be 
significantly different from zero (cells with no shading in Figure 2). Significant coefficients in 
the non-treated will be a violation of our identifying assumption; that time trends in earnings 
are similar for fathers of children of various ages absent the reform.  
Even if the estimated coefficients in the non-treated cells are non-significant, our 
research design may still generate biased estimates if there are unobservable changes in 
characteristics that are discontinuous, child-cohort specific and occur at the time of 
implementation of the paternity quota and have an effect on earnings. One possible concern 
is, for example, that the reform induced couples to have children at a younger age.
23 Then the 
decrease in earnings among treated fathers may simply be because our treated fathers are of a 
younger age. We investigate such possible sources of bias in a specification analysis 
exploring how our estimates are sensitive to included covariates.  
Since not all fathers utilized the opportunity to take paternity leave, the treatment is 
only intentional (Intention To Treat, ITT). In order to capture the effect on fathers who are 













TOT  is the treatment of the treated (TOT) effect for fathers of children aged a in year 
y,  ηay is our estimated treatment effect (ITT) from Equation (2), and υy-a is the uptake rate for 
fathers of children born in year y-a.
24 
 
5. Results  
5.1. Main Results 
Table 3 presents OLS estimates of the DD-coefficients (ηay). Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity and non-independence of residuals across 
fathers’ earnings observed at different points in time.
25 Year and age fixed effects, as well as 
relevant control variables for parents and child (Described in Section 3), are all included in 
the model.  
                                                 
23 A number of studies find that family policies affect fertility patterns. See Gauthier (2007) for a recent review.  
24 The TOT-estimates are somewhat underestimated since there was a certain uptake of paternity leave also in 
the comparison group.  
25 Using the “robust cluster(.)” option in Stata. The table reveals a step-wise pattern in incremental effects on log-earnings for treated 
fathers consistent with the shading in Figure 2.
26 In particular, we can see that the DD-
coefficients of children born after 1994 (treated children) are significant and negative in all 
years and for all ages of the child. The DD-coefficients for fathers of children born in 1993 or 
1994 (treated during Phase-in-Period) are negative, but small and only significant when the 
child is 1-3 years old, which corresponds well with the phase-in-period of the uptake 
documented in Figure 2. Importantly, apart for two year olds in 1994, the DD-coefficients are 
small and not significantly different from zero for children born prior to 1993. This finding is 
consistent with our identifying assumption that time trends in earnings are similar for fathers 
of children of various ages absent the reform. 
We can see that for a father of a given cohort, the treatment effect decreases somewhat 
as the child gets older, i.e. diagonally in the matrix, but is still significant when the child is 
five years old.
27 Larger incremental earnings drop for fathers of younger cohorts can largely 
be explained by the increase in uptake of the reform. Adjusting for this, the earnings drop 
remains fairly stable across cohorts. 
As discussed in Section 2, Norway introduced several extensions in the parental leave 
legislation during our period of study. Even if fathers’ utilization of these extensions were 
limited, fathers were indirectly affected if mothers’ reduced labor supply
 motivated fathers to 
increase theirs. If fathers responded to the general extension of the parental leave in 1993 
from 35 to 42 weeks (see Figure 3) by increasing their labor supply, then our treatment effects 
are under-estimated. Note, however, that we find no evidence in Table 3 for fathers 
responding to the gradual extensions from 18 to 42 weeks parental leave prior to 1993. In 
contrast, we find that time trends in earnings are similar for fathers of children of various 
ages. Thus, since fathers’ earnings have not been affected by general extensions in parental 
leave rights prior to 1993, a response to the 1993-extention in general leave rights is unlikely.  
In Section 2 we also discussed how the introduction of a cash-for-care subsidy in 1998 
had a substantial impact on mothers’ but no effect on fathers’ labor supply. Consistent with 
Drange and Rege (2010), Table 3 suggests that the cash-for-care subsidy had no effect on 
fathers’ labor force participation. If the subsidy had an effect, then we would expect to see a 
change in the DD-coefficients for the fathers of one and two year old children starting in 
1998.  
                                                 
26 When earnings are measured linearly we find the same pattern. We also find the same pattern when 1993 is the 
reference year, rather than 1992.  
27 Note that the treatment effect for fathers of one and two year olds can partly be explained for some fathers by 
less than 100 percent earnings compensation when being on leave, see footnote 6.  Altogether, Table 3 provides substantial evidence that the paternity quota had a 
significant negative long-term effect on fathers’ earnings. The effect persists up until our last 
point of observation when the child is five years old. The incremental effects on earnings for 
treated fathers lie in the range of 1 to 2.7 percent, suggesting that fathers on average earn 1 to 
2.7 percent less as a direct consequence of the paternity quota. When adjusting the ITT 
estimate for relevant uptake rates, the TOT effect on earnings ranges from 1.6 to 4.5 percent. 
As a comparison, estimated effects on earnings of an additional year of education are 





5.2. Specification Analysis 
The identifying assumption in our DD-approach is that time trends in earnings for 
fathers of children of various ages would have been similar absent the reform. The fact that 
we do not observe significant DD-effects on earnings prior to the reform in Table 3 (apart 
from two year olds in 1994) supports our identifying assumption. However, our estimates 
may still be biased by changes in characteristics that are discontinuous, child-cohort specific, 
occurred at the time of implementation of the paternity quota and had an effect on earnings.
 In 
Table 2, even if we cannot observe with the naked eye any cohort specific and discontinuous 
changes in characteristics occurring at the time of the introduction of the paternity quota, we 
still investigate such possible sources of bias by exploring how our estimates are sensitive to 
the inclusion of different covariates and different sample restrictions. 
We carry out our specification analyses by collapsing all treatment variables of fathers 
of children born after 1994 (after the phase-in-period) to one treatment variable, and all the 
treatment variables of fathers of children born in 1993 and 1994 (during the phase-in-period) 
to one phase-in-treatment variable. The comparison group consists of fathers of children born 
before the paternity quota was introduced in 1993. Figure 2 illustrates the nature of the 
experiment: darkly shaded cells are collapsed to form the treatment group, and white cells are 
collapsed to form the comparison group. Lightly shaded cells represent those treated during 
the phase-in-period.  
The results are reported in Table 4. All models include year and age fixed effects. 
Models 1-5 add covariates stepwise for child, mother and father characteristics, and 
                                                 
28 See Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) for an overview of empirical findings.  municipality fixed effects. We can see that the additional covariates increase the explanatory 
power of our model (adjusted R-square). However, the treatment estimates remain at around 
1.3 percent across the different model specifications. This suggests that the treatment effect is 
not biased by any cohort specific and discontinuous changes in observable characteristics. 
The corresponding TOT-estimate ranges from 2.0 to 2.3 percent. Fathers treated in the phase-
in-period face a 0.5 percent decrease in earnings on average. 
Models 6 and 7 investigate how the treatment estimate is affected by different sample 
restrictions. In Model 6 we relax the age restriction that both parents should be older than 25 
years old when the child was born. When including all parents older than 21 years old, the 
estimated treatment effect drops to 1.0 percent. Notably, the uptake rate is lower when we 
relax the age restriction, partly explaining the lower treatment effect. In Model 7 we can see 
that when tightening the age restriction to parents who were older than 27 years old when the 
child was born, the estimated treatment effect increases to 1.7 percent. 
One possible concern is that the paternity quota affected fertility. In particular, if the 
reform increases father involvement, this may motivate couples to have another child which 
they otherwise would not have had. This, in turn, could have an impact on our estimates of 
long-term treatment effects, since a selected sample of fathers of older children will exit our 
sample and enter with a younger child. We address this concern in Model 8 by restricting our 
sample to fathers of single children. The estimated treatment effect remains basically the 
same.  
We have limited our sample to full-time employed fathers. As discussed in Section 2, 
this restriction is problematic if the reform had an impact on the fathers’ decision to be full-
time employed. We investigate this assertion in Table 5. In this table we have dropped the 
sample restriction of full-time employment and the dependent variable is a dummy indicating 
whether the father is full-time employed. Apart from these changes, Models 1 and 2 
correspond to Models 1 and 4 in Table 4. We can see that in both specifications there is a 
small and insignificant relationship between the treatment variables and full-time 
employment.
29 This is consistent with the hypothesis that the reform did not have an effect on 
the fathers’ decision to be full-time employed. 
 
5.3. Subsample Analyses: Father’s Education Level  
                                                 
29 Analyzing this relationship within the same research design as Table 3, we find no pattern in the probability of 
being full-time employed that could be related to the introduction of the paternity quota (table not reported). In Table 6 we investigate how the response to the paternity quota varies across 
different levels of education. We utilize the same collapsed-form specification as Model 4 in 
Table 4. Since uptake rates are likely to vary between sub-groups, we also report the 
corresponding TOT-estimates.
30 Model 1-Model 3 in Table 6 show substantial differences in 
response to the paternity quota for different levels of education. The drop in earnings is larger 
for fathers who have not completed high school. Adjusting for relevant uptake rates amplifies 
the differences and gives us a TOT-effect of a 3.4 percent drop in earnings for fathers who 
have not completed high school, compared to 2.4 percent for high school graduates and 1.0 
percent for university graduates. The effect for university graduates is not statistically 
significant. Some studies suggest that lower educated fathers are less involved with their 
children (Yeung et.al 2001) and our findings may reflect that the paternity quota has a 
stronger effect on this group where the potential increase in involvement is largest. 
Alternatively, our findings may reflect that highly educated fathers have a higher opportunity 





5.4. Effects on Mothers’ Labor Supply 
In Table 7 we investigate how the paternity quota affected mothers’ labor market 
participation. Since many mothers do not work or work part-time, marginal changes in 
mothers’ earnings are not a good measure of mothers’ labor market responses. Instead we 
investigate how the reform affected the mothers’ likelihood of working. Our analytical sample 
is the spouses of the fathers in our main analysis. A mother is coded as employed in a given 
year if she is registered at year end as employed with at least 20 hours per week.
32 Apart from 
the dependent variable, the analysis is designed in accordance with the analysis reported in 
Table 3. 
The DD-coefficients in Table 7 do not show a stepwise pattern that corresponds to the 
changes in fathers’ earnings reported in Table 3. We can see a strong decrease in labor supply 
for mothers of one year old children in 1995, most likely due to the extended job protection 
                                                 
30 Table A1 in the Appendix reports correlations between background characteristics and the probability of 
taking paternity leave.  
31 Empirical findings on the association between education level and father involvement is non-conclusive. See 
e.g. Yeung et.al 2001 for an overview of the literature.   
32 In addition, earnings have to be above an indexed minimum of about €19 000 in 2010 (2 times “Basic 
Amount”). We add the earnings restriction because firms are often late in reporting changes in employment 
status after a work spell has ended. implemented the same year. As expected, the table also shows that the cash-for-care subsidy 
implemented in 1998 decreased the labor supply of women with one year old children (from 
1998) and two year old children (from 1999).
33 However, we cannot see that the paternity 
quota affected mothers’ labor supply.  
 
6. Understanding the Earnings Drop: Time Use Data  
The negative effect of paternity leave on long-term earnings is consistent with 
increased long-term father involvement and a redirection of effort from market to home 
production. However, there are at least two other stories for why paternity leave could affect 
fathers’ earnings. First, taking time off from work to be on paternity leave may serve as a 
signal of being more family-oriented rather than career-oriented. Employers may consider 
such employees as being less devoted and reliable, thus reducing the likelihood of their giving 
promotions and pay raises. Second, the negative effect on earnings may reflect foregone 
human capital accumulation while being on leave. The signaling story does not seem 
plausible, however, because the uptake of the reform was very high within a few years. 
Moreover, four weeks
34 of foregone human capital accumulation seems unlikely to have an 
impact on earnings four years later. Nevertheless, more direct evidence for the effect of the 
paternity quota on father involvement would strengthen the hypothesis of a causal 
relationship. 
Lack of data on hourly wage rates and number of hours worked limits our possibilities 
to investigate alternative mechanisms utilizing register data. Instead, we turn to data from the 
Norwegian Time Use Surveys in order to provide more direct evidence for the effect of 
paternity leave on father involvement.  
 
6.1 Data  
The analysis is based on respondent-reported time diaries data from the 1990 and 2000 
Norwegian Time Use Surveys. In each of these surveys a representative cross-section sample 
of the Norwegian population was asked to keep a time diary for two consecutive days (48 
hours). In 2000, the diaries were split into 10 minute slots, and in 1990 into 30 minute slots. 
For each time slot, respondents were asked to report their main activities, where they were at 
the time, and together with whom. Each respondent was also interviewed to collect 
                                                 
33 The first fully treated mothers of the cash-for-care subsidy are those giving birth after July 1998. This explains 
the gradually increasing treatment effect. See e.g. Schone (2004).  
34 As noted in Section 2, 90 percent of leave-taking fathers were on leave for four weeks or less.  demographic and socio-economic background information such as household composition 
and work hours. Finally, information on respondents’ education level and earnings was 
collected from official registers.  
The net sample from the 2000 survey comprised around 3500 individuals, after a 
response rate of about 50 percent. The corresponding numbers for the 1990 survey was 3000 
individuals with a response rate of 64 percent. We exclude time diaries kept during weekends. 
Thereafter, we restrict our analytical sample in accordance with the selection criteria 
described in Section 3. First, we exclude fathers who were 25 years or younger at the time 
when the youngest child was born. Second, we only include fathers reporting that they are 
full-time workers.
35 Finally, we limit our sample to fathers whose youngest child was between 
one and twelve years old during the years 1990 and 2000. Notably, this last restriction is 
different from the selection criteria in the register analysis which focused on fathers whose 
youngest child was between one and eight years old. We include children up until age twelve 
in this analysis in order to get a sufficiently large comparison group.
36 This leaves us with a 
total sample of 407 fathers, 186 from the 1990 survey and 221 from the 2000 survey.  
Fathers of 1-5 year olds in 2000 are coded as treated, and fathers of 6-7 year olds in 
2000 are coded as treated in the phase-in-period (See Figure 1). The comparison group 
consists of fathers of 8-12 year olds in 2000 and all fathers in 1990. Notably, since we only 
have data from 1990 and 2000, we cannot connect differential time allocation directly to the 
reform as a treatment effect. Still, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to fathers of 1-5 
year olds in 2000 as “treated”. 
We explore changes in fathers’ time allocation by observing changes in time spent 
working versus time spent at home. Time spent working includes all time spent on activities 
related to paid work (working, lunch break and other breaks, and travel time between work 
and home). Time spent at home is all time reported being at home, nights included. 
Furthermore, we attempt to explore changes in father involvement by observing changes in 
time fathers spent with their children. Following Lamb et.al (1987) we measure father 
involvement along three different dimensions: Availability, responsibility and interaction. We 
construct three different dependent variables that may capture these dimensions: We measure 
                                                 
35 Fathers are recorded as “full-time workers” if they report working regularly at least 37.5 hours per week, 
which is the statutory “full-time work” in Norway. We do not have data on whether the father is self-employed. 
As in our analysis on register data, we find that full-time working is not significantly affected by the reform (see 
Table 8).  
36 A sample of fathers of children up to 8 years old left us with a comparison group for 2000 with only 18 
observations. When doing the analyses with this small sample, we get similar but less precisely estimated 
effects.  availability as all time spent together with the youngest child, irrespective of location (may be 
away from home). Responsibility is measured as time together with the youngest child when 
the mother is not present, otherwise along the same lines as availability. Interaction is 
measured as time where childcare is reported as being the primary activity, such as caring for, 
playing with, talking with or reading to children living in the household.
37  
In summary, this leaves us with five dependent variables of fathers’ time allocation 
and involvement: Time spent working, time spent at home, time spent together with the child, 
time spent together with the child when the mother is not present and time spent interacting 
with children. All five variables are measured as minutes per day, calculated as the average 
over the two diary days. If the paternity quota had an impact on father involvement and made 
them redirect their time use towards home production rather than market production, then we 
would expect to find a negative treatment effect on time spent working, and positive treatment 
effects on time spent at home and together with the child.  
We construct control variables capturing child, father and mother characteristics in 
accordance with those described in Section 3 when data are available:  
- Youngest child characteristics: Number of older siblings (0,1,2,>3), child’s age 
(1,2,3,4…12), child’s gender. 
- Parent characteristics: Father’s age at birth of youngest child (linear and quadratic), father’s 
and mother’s education level (not completed high school, highs school degree, university 
degree). 
We also include dummies for which weekdays the father kept the diary in addition to 
year fixed effects.   
 
6.2 Results 
Summary statistics of time use are reported in Table 9. We find that among fathers of 
one-five year olds, treated fathers (fathers in 2000) spent less time at work than non-treated 
fathers (fathers in 1990). Less time at work is mirrored by slightly more time spent at home. 
In particular, we see diverging trends in time use at work and at home for fathers of 1-5 year 
olds versus fathers of 8-12 year olds. Similarly, while time spent together with the youngest 
child drops substantially from 1990 to 2000 for fathers of 8-12 year olds, the time use of 
                                                 
37 Data allow us to identify time interacting with children, where children are together with the father at the 
given time slot. Since the father may interact with one child while other children also are present, we cannot 
measure time a father interacts with a specific child. While Availability and Responsibility are measured as 
minutes per day together with the youngest child, Interaction is measured as minutes spent interacting with all 
children in the household.  fathers of 1-5 year olds remains fairly constant over the same period. These patterns are 
consistent with the hypothesis that fathers affected by the paternity quota have redirected 
more time into home production and are more involved with their children.  
A possible concern when inspecting Table 9 is that the diverging trends for fathers of 
8-12 year olds and 1-5 year olds are mainly driven by changes in the trends for fathers of 8-12 
year olds. The diverging trends may be due to something that happened to fathers of the older 
children and not due to the paternity quota. We cannot rule out this possibility. However, 
summary statistics for similar mothers in the Time Use Surveys reported in Table 10 reveal 
that trends in time use for both mothers of 8-12 year olds and mothers of 1-5 year olds follow 
the same pattern as time changes for fathers of 8-12 year olds. This suggests that diverging 
trends for fathers of young and old children are not driven by the changes of the fathers of 8-
12 year olds. A possible explanation is that there is a general trend where fathers and mothers 
spend less time with their children, and that the paternity quota reversed this trend for the 
father.  
Similar to the analysis of register data (see Equation 2), we estimate the following 
















iay denotes time (minutes) spent on u (work; at home; with youngest child; alone with 
youngest child; interacting with children) for father i of a child aged a (a=1,2,3…12) in year y 
(y=1990,2000), Y and A1-5 and A6-7 capture year (y = 2000) and age dummies, and Xiy is a 
vector of father, mother and child characteristics described in Section 6.1. The coefficient   
η
u
1-5 measures the “treatment effects” of the paternity quota. 
Table 11, Panel A summarizes the results from the DD-analysis. We find that treated 
fathers reduce their time spent working by 79 minutes (Model 1b), and increase their time 
spent at home by 70 minutes per day (Model 2b), but the effects are not statistically 
significant. Regarding time use at home, we find that treated fathers increase the time spent 
together with the child by 64 minutes (Model 3b), and by 38 minutes when the mother is not 
present (Model 4b). Finally, we find that treated fathers interact 8 minutes more per day with 
the child, but this effect is not statistically significant (Model 5b). When estimating the 
models without any covariates, the treatment estimates move by only a few minutes (Model 
1a-5a), suggesting that the treatment effects are not affected by compositional changes in the treatment and comparison group. In Table 11, Panel B we report results from a DDD-analysis 
including similar mothers in the comparison group. These results should be interpreted with 
caution since mothers time use may also be affected by the paternity quota.
38 Compared to the 
DD-framework, this approach yields stronger treatment effects on fathers’ time use with 
children.  
In summary, the evidence in Tables 9 and 11 is consistent with the hypothesis that 
fathers affected by the paternity quota have redirected time and effort from market production 
to home production, and they invest more time in their children. Reduced work hours, 
mirrored by increased time use together with children, seems to be a plausible explanation for 




In this paper we have investigated the effects of paternity leave on long-term father 
involvement. We have utilized variation in exposure to the non-transferable paternity quota of 
the parental leave as exogenous variation in leave taking. We find strong evidence for a drop 
in earnings associated with the paternity quota: The four weeks of paternity leave during the 
child’s first year decrease fathers’ future earnings by 2.1 percent. The drop in earnings is 
consistent with increased father involvement, as fathers shift time and effort from market to 
home production. In order to further investigate this hypothesis, we turn to time diaries from 
the Norwegian Time Use Surveys and demonstrate that affected fathers spent significantly 
more time together with their children after the paternity quota was implemented. We also 
find that treated fathers spent less time working, but the effect is not statistically significant. 
Together with our analysis of registry data, which provides convincing evidence of a causal 
effect of the paternity quota on earnings, the time use analyses suggest that the paternity quota 
had an impact on long-term father involvement. 
This study is important because it suggests that paternity leave policies potentially 
have implications for child well-being (Han, Ruhm and Waldfogel 2009). Increasing 
empirical evidence suggests that the involvement of a father in his children’s lives is 
important for the children’s cognitive and socio-emotional outcomes.
39 The policy relevance 
of this paper is highlighted by the fact that the European Parliament recently adopted a 
                                                 
38 As summary statistics on mothers suggested, a separate analysis for mothers (not reported here) results in no 
significant treatment effects on time use with children, and all estimates are negative.  
39 See for example Lamb (2010) and Tamis-Lemonda and Cabrera (2002). directive stipulating the minimum requirements for parental leave, including a non-
transferrable paternity quota of four weeks.
40 Moreover, the Norwegian paternity quota was 
extended from 6 to 10 weeks in 2009 and further extensions are expected. Our results suggest 
that paternity leave has the expected positive effect on long-term father involvement. The next 
step for future studies is to investigate how paternity leave affects child outcomes. 
                                                 
40 European Union: Council Directive 2010/18/EU. The 27 member countries are to implement the directive in 
national legislation within two years.  References: 
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 Tables:  
 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics.  
Means (and standard deviations).  
 
   
Outcome variables   
   
Father’s earnings (NOK)  311 740 
(180 714) 
Mother employed   0.508 
   
   
Control variables   
   
Father age at birth   33.78 
(4.75) 
Mother age at birth  31.27 
(3.78) 
Father age at birth of first child  28.39 
(4.76) 
Mother age at birth of first child  26.11 
(4.35) 
Number of children  2.26 
(0.96) 
Age of child  3.94 
(2.29) 
   
Father not completed high school  0.094 
Father high school degree  0.585 
Father university degree  0.319 
Mother not completed high school  0.081 
Mother high school degree  0.599 
Mother university degree  0.319 
   
   
N (observations)  1 127 093 
   
N (children)  327 893 
N (fathers)  261 324 
   
 Table 2: Summary statistics of parents by child’s birth year. Means. 
Birth year:  1989  1990 1991  1992 1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
                     
Panel A: All variables observed one year prior to birth             
                       
Outcome variables:                        
Father’s earnings (NOK)  na.  na. na.  na.  235 277  239 570  244 906  254 747  267 803  283 807  311 577 
Mother employed  na.  na. na.  na.  0.600  0.615  0.621  0.623  0.625  0.647  0.653 
Characteristics:                     
Father’s age  na.  na. na.  na.  32.44  32.38  32.47  32.47  32.52  32.46  32.56 
Mother’s age  na.  na. na.  na.  29.89  29.88  29.95  30.00  30.10  30.11  30.21 
Father’s age at birth of first child  na.  na. na.  na.  28.71  28.74  28.84  28.91  29.05  29.16  29.28 
Mother’s age at birth of first child  na.  na. na.  na.  26.48  26.57  26.69  26.73  26.86  27.03  27.13 
Father not completed high school  na.  na. na.  na.  0.100  0.091  0.087  0.080  0.072  0.065  0.057 
Father high school degree  na.  na. na.  na.  0.586  0.591  0.593  0.595  0.594  0.589  0.589 
Father university degree  na.  na. na.  na.  0.310  0.316  0.317  0.322  0.332  0.345  0.352 
Mother not completed high school  na.  na. na.  na.  0.073  0.067  0.066  0.059  0.054  0.049  0.044 
Mother high school degree  na.  na. na.  na.  0.603  0.592  0.577  0.569  0.561  0.544  0.530 
Mother university degree  na.  na. na.  na.  0.322  0.339  0.355  0.370  0.383  0.405  0.424 
N  na.  na. na.  na.  25 130  26 189  26 305  26 842  26 333  24 751  22 153 
                       
Panel B: All variables observed when child is three years old             
                       
Outcome variables:                        
Father’s earnings       266 654       272 947       278 479      287 107      300 051       313 909        334 033        350 240        371 837   na.  na. 
Mother employed  0.469  0.478 0.506  0.508  0.525  0.540  0.553  0.535  0.508  na.  na. 
Characteristics:                     
Number of children  2.24  2.24 2.26  2.27  2.26  2.26  2.24  2.24  2.22  na.  na. 
Father not completed high school  0.108  0.108 0.105  0.098  0.093  0.088  0.081  0.074  0.067  na.  na. 
Father high school degree  0.564  0.566 0.578  0.591  0.594  0.597  0.607  0.615  0.614  na.  na. 
Father university degree  0.325  0.323 0.314  0.308  0.310  0.313  0.310  0.309  0.318  na.  na. 
Mother not completed high school  0.097  0.089 0.089  0.079  0.070  0.069  0.069  0.059  0.056  na.  na. 
Mother high school degree  0.605  0.611 0.605  0.618  0.619  0.609  0.597  0.594  0.587  na.  na. 
Mother university degree  0.296  0.298 0.304  0.302  0.309  0.320  0.332  0.346  0.356  na.  na. 
N         15 632         16 802        17 030        16 983         17 406         18 062          18 305          17 747          16 695   na.  na. 
   27
Table 3: Main results: Incremental effects on fathers’ earnings by age of the child and year. 
 
         
Dependent variable: Fathers’ log earnings         
                   
Year 
                   














                   
1  --  -0.003  -0.012***  -0.013***  -0.018***  -0.021***  -0.019***  -0.025***  -0.023*** 
    (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
                   
2  --  -0.006  -0.010**  -0.009**  -0.014***  -0.024***  -0.016***  -0.021***  -0.030*** 
    (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
                   
3  --  0.003  -0.004  -0.001  -0.002  -0.008*  -0.012***  -0.011**  -0.016*** 
    (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
                   
4  --  -0.001  -0.003  -0.005  -0.001  -0.003  -0.004  -0.010**  -0.011** 
    (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
                   
5  --  0.005  -0.004  0.004  -0.003  -0.002  0.001  -0.004  -0.011** 
      (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
                     
  6  --  0.002  -0.001  -0.004  0.003  -0.003  0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
      (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
                     
  7-8  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
                     
Notes:  
No. of observations: 1 127 093. Adjusted R
2 = 0.210. Estimates reflect results from single OLS models, adjusted for 
year fixed effects, child characteristics (birth order, gender, age and birth month) and parent characteristics (education 
level, age when the child was born and age when first child was born). *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 
5 percent and 1 percent level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for non-independence of residuals across 
fathers at different points in time.  28  29
 Table 4: Specification Tests. Collapsed treatment and comparison group.   
                 
                 
Dependent variable: Fathers’ log earnings                 
                 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
                 
Treated  -0.0128***  -0.0125***  -0.0135***  -0.0142***  -0.0121***  -0.0098***  -0.0166***  -0.0112** 
  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0028)  (0.0027)  (0.0025)  (0.0023)  (0.0031)  (0.0057) 
                 
Treated in phase-in-period  -0.0048**  -0.0052**  -0.0047**  -0.0049**  -0.0046**  -0.0038**  -0.0060**  -0.0020 
  (0.0024)  (0.0024)  (0.0023)  (0.0022)  (0.0021)  (0.0019)  (0.0026)  (0.0046) 
                 
Covariates included:                 
  Child characteristics    X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
  Mother characteristics      X  X  X  X  X  X 
  Father characteristics        X  X  X  X  X 
  Municipality fixed effects          X       
                 
Uptake rate  0.622  0.622  0.622  0.622  0.622  0.595  0.629  0.685 
TOT-effect (treatment of the treated)  0.0206  0.0201  0.0217  0.0228  0.0195  0.0165  0.0264  0.0164 
                 
Other sample restriction           
Parents  
> 21 yrs 
Parents  
> 27 yrs 
Fathers of 
first borns 
                 
                 
Adjusted R
2  0.093  0.096  0.143  0.210  0.281  0.236  0.200  0.205 
N  1 227 093  1 227 093  1 227 093  1 227 093  1 227 093  1 404 670  903 749  232 007 
                 
 
Notes:  
Estimates reflect results from single OLS models, adjusted for year fixed effects, child characteristics (birth order, gender, age and birth month) and parent 
characteristics (education level, age when the child was born and age when first child was born). *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 
1 percent level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for non-independence of residuals across fathers at different points in time. 
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Table 5: Effect of reform on father being full-time employed  
 
     
Dependent variable:     
Father working full-time     
     
     
  Model 1  Model 2 
     













     
Covariates included  Yes  No 
     
     
Adjusted R
2  0.0341  0.0039 
Mean  0.740  0.740 
N  1 523 798  1 523 798 
     
     
 
Notes:  
Estimates reflect results from single OLS models, adjusted for year fixed effects, child 
characteristics (birth order, gender, age and birth month) and parent characteristics 
(education level, age when the child was born and age when first child was born). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for non-independence of residuals 
across fathers at different points in time.   31




Dependent variable: Fathers’ log earnings 
 
     












degree   








(0.005)   
         
Uptake rate  0.525  0.610  0.667   
  Treated (TOT)  -0.0346  -0.0266  -0.0104   








(0.004)   
         
         
Adjusted R
2  0.138  0.129  0.113   
N  106 182  659 146  359 110   
         
 
Notes:  
Estimates reflect results from single OLS models, adjusted for year fixed 
effects, child characteristics (birth order, gender, age and birth month) and 
parent characteristics (education level, age when the child was born and age 
when first child was born). *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected 
for non-independence of residuals across fathers at different points in time. 
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Table 7: Incremental effects on mothers’ labor supply by age of the child and year.  
 
Dependent variable: Mother working at least part-time.  
 
                     
          Year           
                     














                   
1  --  -0.001  0.005  -0.021***  -0.016***  -0.040***  -0.093***  -0.107***  -0.125*** 
    (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.006) 
                   
2  --  0.010  0.005  0.005  -0.013**  -0.026***  -0.044***  -0.086***  -0.092*** 
    (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)  
                   
3  --  -0.003  0.006  0.003  -0.002  -0.011  -0.021***  -0.038***  -0.055*** 
    (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)  
                   
4  --  0.018***  0.008  0.020**  0.017**  0.019***  0.005  0.000  -0.008 
    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)  
                   
5  --  0.001  0.013  0.007  0.012*  0.012*  0.011  0.012  0.000 
      (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.008)  
                     
  6  --  0.012  0.003  0.015**  0.003  0.003  0.005  0.012  0.008 
      (0.008)   (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)  
                     
  7-8  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
                     
Notes:  
No. of observations: 1 127 093. Adjusted R
2 = 0.089. Mean of dependent variable: 0.508. Estimates reflect results from 
single OLS models, adjusted for year fixed effects, child characteristics (birth order, gender, age and birth month) and 
parent characteristics (education level, age when the child was born and age when first child was born). *, ** and *** 
denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for non-
independence of residuals across fathers at different points in time.  34  35
Table 8: Effect of reform on father being full-time employed 
 
 
     
Dependent variable:     
Father working full-time     
     
     
  Model 1  Model 2 
     















     
Covariates included  Yes  No 
     
     
Adjusted R
2  0.0429  0.0038 
     
Mean  0.80  0.80 
N  508  508 




Estimates reflect results from single OLS models, adjusted for year fixed effects, child 
characteristics (birth order, gender, age and birth month) and parent characteristics 
(education level, age when the child was born and age when first child was born). *, ** 
and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses, corrected for non-independence of residuals across 
fathers at different points in time. Source: 1990 and 2000 survey data (Time use) from 
Statistics Norway 
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    Allocation of time between work and home      -------------------  Time use together with children  -------------------     
                           
    Time spent at work    Time spent at home      Availability    Responsibility    Interaction     
                                     
    1990  2000    1990  2000      1990  2000    1990  2000    1990  2000    N 
                                     
1-5 years    525.4  475.6    752.8  763.2      229.6  223.3    83.4  88.4    66.4  58.1    236 
    (191.1)  (221.6)    (230.6)  (249.9)      (162.5)  (165.0)    (85.9)  (99.6)    (59.0)  (52.9)     
                                     
6-7 years    536.9  449.4    755.8  715.6      245.5  209.4    125.5  90.3    44.7  31.1    53 
    (204.2)  (252.8)    (142.9)  (314.9)      (190.6)  (152.4)    (91.5)  (103.1)    (46.0)  (31.1)     
                                     
8-12 years    483.6  498.4    791.8  763.0      236.3  170.0    85.2  60.3    32.9  19.4    118 
    (152.5)  (200.3)    (222.6)  (186.0)      (152.2)  (141.9)    (97.0)  (99.3)    (48.5)  (31.0)     
                                     
                                     
N    186  221    186  221      186  221    186  221    186  221    407 




Measures of time use together with children: Availability =  minutes per day together with the child. Responsibility =  minutes per day together with the child when 
the mother is not present. Interaction =  minutes per day when caring for the child is reported as the main activity. Source: 1990 and 2000 survey data (Time use) 
from Statistics Norway. 
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    Allocation of time between work and home      -------------------  Time use together with children  -------------------     
                           
    Time spent at work    Time spent at home      Availability    Responsibility    Interaction     
                                     
    1990  2000    1990  2000      1990  2000    1990  2000    1990  2000    N 
                                     
1-5 years    314.0  360.6    850.8  877.7      418.5  310.8    298.0  203.5    139.5  120.5    114 
    (236.4)  (230.7)    (358.1)  (288.6)      (215.3)  (190.3)    (225.5)  (159.9)    (76.2)  (97.6)     
                                     
6-7 years    352.5  381.4    993.8  821.2      330.0  291.2    285.0  203.8    136.9  65.7    25 
    (239.3)  (192.1)    (263.1)  (239.0)      (169.3)  (195.2)    (210.4)  (154.1)    (57.6)  (35.2)     
                                     
8-12 years    317.9  416.3    926.1  854.7      241.4  219.3    133.6  111.0    45.0  34.6    57 
    (211.6)  (213.8)    (224.3)  (230.9)      (152.2)  (156.8)    (128.4)  (106.2)    (54.3)  (34.2)     
                                     
                                     
N    55  141    55  141      55  141    55  141    55  141    196 




Measures of time use together with children: Availability =  minutes per day together with the child. Responsibility =  minutes per day together with the child when 
the mother is not present. Interaction =  minutes per day when caring for the child is reported as the main activity. Source: 1990 and 2000 survey data (Time use) 
from Statistics Norway. 
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Table 11: Results from time use data.  
 
                               
    Allocation of time between work and home    -------------------  Time use together with children  ------------------- 
                               
    Model 1:    Model 2:    Model 3:    Model 4:    Model 5: 
Dependent variable:    Time spent  
at work    Time spent  
at home    Availability    Responsibility    Interaction 
    (a)  (b)    (a)  (b)    (a)  (b)    (a)  (b)    (a)  (b) 
                               
                               
Panel A:                               
Treated (DD) 
  -77.06  -79.26    65.17  70.36    63.14*  64.01*    30.65  37.58*    9.56  8.33 
  (47.4)  (48.8)    (55.0)  (55.5)    (30.3)  (37.1)    (22.4)  (22.0)    (11.35)  (11.5) 
                               
R2 adjusted    0.0292  0.0105    0.0130  -0.0019    0.0068  0.0707    0.0078  0.0839    0.1508  0.162 
Mean    496.4  496.4    759.2  759.2    217.0  217.0    83.3  83.3    48.0  48.0 
N    407  407    407  407    407  407    407  407    407  407 
                               
                               
                               
Panel B:                                
Treated (DDD) 
  -39.80  -43.05    -32.77  -15.6    161.77**  185.2***    96.03*  128.7**    17.73  15.46 
  (90.7)  (90.8)    (106.3)  (108.3)    (71.7)  (71.4)    (51.5)  (50.6)    (24.6)  (24.8) 
                               
R2 adjusted    0.095  0.085    0.026  -0.015    0.085  0.118    0.201  0.249    0.287  0.292 
Mean    452.4  452.4    795.5  795.5    244.4  244.4    119.7  119.7    63.0  63.0 
N    603  603    603  603    603  603    603  603    603  603 
                               
Covariates included:    No  Yes    No  Yes    No  Yes    No  Yes    No  Yes 
                               
 
Notes:    39
Estimates reflect results from single OLS models with year and age fixed effects. Covariates are number of older siblings, gender, father’s age when child was born, 
parents’ education level and weekdays the diaries were kept. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Source: 1990 and 2000 survey data (Time use) from Statistics Norway.    40
Table A1: Probability for taking paternity leave.  
Dependent variable: Father taking paternity leave     
     
Covariates:  Coefficient  Std. Err. 
Birth order:     
   2
nd birth order  -0.0378***  0.0022 
   3
rd birth order  -0.1312***  0.0032 
   4
th birth order  -0.2140***  0.0047 
   5
th birth order  -0.2843***  0.0078 
   6
th birth order  -0.3455***  0.0141 
   7
th birth order and higher  -0.4893***  0.0182 
Parents’ age when child was born:     
   Father’s age  0.0304***  0.0019 
   Father’s age ^2  -0.0004***  0.0000 
   Mother’s age   -0.0083***  0.0031 
   Mother’s age ^2  0.0001**  0.0000 
Parents’ age when first child was born:     
   Father’s age  0.0021  0.0015 
   Father’s age ^2  -0.0001***  0.0000 
   Mother’s age   0.0591***  0.0018 
   Mother’s age ^2  -0.0009***  0.0000 
Child’s gender: Daughter   -0.0022  0.0015 
Father’s education level:     
   High school degree   0.0409***  0.0029 
   University degree  0.0308***  0.0032 
Mother’s education level:     
   High school degree   0.1260***  0.0032 
   University degree  0.2269***  0.0035 
Birth month:     
   February  -0.0055***  0.0038 
   March  0.0031***  0.0036 
   April  0.0117***  0.0036 
   May  0.0211***  0.0036 
   June  0.0289***  0.0036 
   July  0.0324***  0.0036 
   August  0.0398***  0.0037 
   September  0.0414***  0.0037 
   October  0.0475***  0.0037 
   November  0.0397***  0.0038 
   December  0.0570***  0.0038 
Birth year:     
   1995  0.0787***  0.0021 
   1996  0.1111***  0.0022 
   1997  0.1357***  0.0024 
   1998  0.1583***  0.0027 
   1999  0.1708***  0.0035 
     
R
2 adjusted    0.077   
N  404 262   
 
Notes:  
Sample: Fathers of children born after 1993. Estimates reflect results from single OLS 
model. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels. 
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